In the end, during the Shimla final, Gandhi evolved as a swing factor between strength and accommodating postures. The alternative of calling Bhutto`s bluff and leaving without agreement, Gandhi and Haksar were deemed too expensive after India`s dramatic triumph in 1971. The self-limitation that underpinned India`s attitude was all too noticeable to the Pakistanis. Ahmed, their negotiator, later noted that « India`s excessive fear of avoiding the failure of the talks at all costs has become its great handicap, » while it held « all the negotiating tokens. » Haksar later noted that « force negotiations » are part of the diplomatic currency. But negotiating with someone weak is even more difficult. This agreement is ratified by both countries in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures and enters into force from the date of exchange of ratification instruments.  For the first time in nearly 50 years, when the UN Security Council held an emergency meeting on Kashmir following Modi`s government`s decision of 5 August, India avoided calling Kashmir an integral part of the forum and proposed that each resolution be discussed bilaterally. , as agreed in the Simla agreement. U.S. President Donald Trump has also made several offers of mediation, but the Indian government has refused to accept such a proposal by recalling the Simla agreement.
However, if Pakistan requests bilateral negotiations with India on Kashmir, India insists that it is an integral part of the country and that all discussions with Pakistan would focus solely on the fight against cross-border terrorism and not on the controversial status of Kashmir. In the hope of saving an agreement, Bhutto called Gandhi directly. During the climate meeting, Gandhi stressed the main advantage of the Indian proposal in Kashmir – neither side was forced to physically abandon the territory or exchange populations. With « obvious feeling and sincerity, » Bhutto acknowledged that India`s proposal was the only possible one, but that a legally binding commitment would significantly weaken its domestic political position and strengthen the military establishment. He could give nothing but oral assurance that the de facto border in Kashmir, in Bhutto`s words, would gradually acquire the « characteristics of an international border. » On the other hand, India`s concession was concrete and in advance. India abandoned its « package arrangement by agreeing to withdraw troops from the international border before concluding an agreement on Kashmir. » Agreements must be concluded by these parties and international law has clearly defined the rules and procedures governing the application of treaties. However, a breach of contract by either party may allow others to terminate it, bringing both parties, as far as possible, back to the position they were in before a contract was entered into, which would result in a return to the status quo ante (the previous situation). The actual negotiations began on 28 June 1972 and lasted five days, with India clinging to the approach of Dhar, in which the return of prisoners of war and Indian-occupied territory was part of a set of permanent agreements on the formal delimitation of the Kashmir border. At the inaugural session on 28 June, Mr Dhar made it clear that the conclusion of a peace settlement was an « essential » condition for the repatriation of prisoners of war. On June 29, he sought a clear framework.